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There are some apparently successful cases of collective marketing with staple food 
commodities (grains and root crops), but these are less common than cases involving higher value 
agricultural products.  These can be attributed to the benefit/cost ratio to participants being 
generally higher for collective marketing of the higher-value crops.  Some of the costs are 
‘hidden’, in the sense that they are borne by individuals in time spent in attending meetings, and 
not shown in the financial statements of the enterprises concerned.   
Examining a series of cases, the paper advocates an approach to the marketing of staples 
which involves analyzing the value chain and identifying those activities which on the one hand, 
best lend themselves to individual initiative, and those where on the other hand, group approaches 
are more likely to prosper.  Dual purpose food marketing involving village storage in anticipation 
of both external market opportunities and local lean season shortages usually falls into the former 
category.  Collective initiatives have a higher probability of success when they complement 
agricultural intensification and involve bulking substantial quantities of produce for quality-
conscious commercial buyers.  Prospects for successful collective marketing are moreover greater 
where there is a history of collective endeavor, where focused on simple activities like bulking 
and distribution of inputs, where primary groups are small and homogenous in terms of interests 
and objectives, where they can establish lasting relationships with strong trade counterparties, 
where supported by effective training (especially re attitudes, numeracy, and business skills), 
where they can access effectively managed storage and inventory credit services, and where there 
is framework of law enforcement.  
The immediate poverty alleviation and programmatic priorities of funding agencies often 
undermine the effectiveness of promotional activities in support of collective marketing.  This 
problem may be addressed by instituting systems of independent review and peer review 
processes, and involving open discussion of pros and cons of individual and collective 
approaches.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION - EVIDENCE FOR SUCCESS 
This paper compares the case of staple food crops, which consist for the most part of cereals 
and root crops, with higher value crops and products such as cotton, cocoa, oilseeds, dried fruit, 
spices and seeds, in Africa.  By and large, collective marketing and processing initiatives are more 
successful with the latter than the former.  This is immediately apparent from a systematic study of 
collective marketing initiatives in five African countries that the Natural Resources Institute and the 
Plunkett Foundation carried out in the 1990s (Stringfellow et al. 1997).  The research team identified 
16 relatively successful cases on the basis of prima facie evidence, but only two were concerned with 
staple food crops.  Both of these were dry cereals (sorghum and rice) rather than the more bulky 
staples such as cassava or bananas. 
2.  MARKET-ORIENTED INITIATIVES  
Francophone Experience  
Francophone Africa has seen some of the most notable achievements with collective 
marketing.  Starting in Mali in 1974, ‘Associations Villageoises’ (AVs) and similar producer 
organizations (POs) became a major component of contract-farming systems in the burgeoning 
parastatally-controlled cotton sectors of francophone countries. The parastatals were able to devolve 
much of the responsibility for input and equipment supplies and primary marketing of seed cotton 
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down to these all-village institutions in a mutually beneficial manner.   The AVs worked in a linkage-
dependent relationship with the parastatal cotton companies which oversaw their operation and had a 
vested interest in their survival (Coulter and Tyler 1992; Bingen 1998). 
Mali and other francophone countries have also witnessed large numbers of producer 
organizations (AVs and ‘groupements’) being organized in conjunction with irrigated rice schemes.  
While often playing an important role in service provision, they have encountered many problems.  
The author visited the leading West African irrigation scheme, the Office du Niger in Mali, twice in 
the early 1990s (Coulter and Tyler 1992), and again in 2005, when carrying out a consultancy 
assignment for the European Commission.  In both cases he found that POs were experiencing serious 
governance and management problems.  In 2005, farmers were largely by-passing them in favor of 
other support mechanisms, including micro-finance institutions and money-lenders.  One 
knowledgeable commentator estimated that only 2 percent of all POs working in the zone were 
operating correctly; most of the others were highly indebted and technically bankrupt.    
In the neighboring country, Niger, Henri Chunleau, the Co-Director of the PAFRIZ Rice 
Support Programme expressed misgivings about indiscriminately establishing cooperatives in rice 
schemes, given their lack of coherence with pre-existing hierarchical social structures. Funding 
agencies had in his view paid insufficient attention to this issue, and the weak performance of the 
cooperatives was largely responsible for having to rehabilitate schemes after 20 years.  The 
cooperatives had many difficulties: a lack of clarity concerning ownership of land and equipment: 
poor water management, land preparation and cultural practices; poor management of working capital 
leading to mounting debt and inadequate input supplies; a mixture of varieties adversely affecting the 
quality of milled rice; and early sales of milled rice.  In view of these problems, PAFRIZ was 
providing intense support to a group of ten of the more successful schemes, covering a total of 2,000 
ha, through the establishment of a business services centre (CPS) with the aim of enabling farmers to 
provide the services they needed.  Groups were also being formed around specific activities such as 
production of seedlings and mechanization.  Related to his misgivings about the cooperative model, 
Chunleau felt that private investors should participate in the development of the remaining 200,000 ha 
of Niger which was suitable for irrigated rice.
2 
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Experiences from Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania and Ghana 
In various parts of Mozambique, collective marketing has been organized along somewhat 
similar lines to francophone Africa. However, the commercial partners are not parastatals, but private 
cotton and tobacco companies operating as monopsonists within officially sanctioned geographic 
concessions.  The primary organizations are voluntary groupings of typically 30 members, often 
called ‘Rural Group Enterprises’ (or RGEs), promoted by NGOs specialized in agricultural 
development.   As in Francophone countries, most of the successful collective marketing has been 





Table 1.  Evidence for success of collective marketing with staple vis-à-vis higher value crops in 
Africa 
Case Evidence  Source 
Market-oriented initiatives  
Ghana, 1995  Three ‘successful’ cases were in cocoa financing (in 
conjunction with Barclays Bank), seed (for maize and 
cowpeas), and oil palm 
Uganda, 1996  Five ‘successful’ cases were in coffee, coffee/beans, 
vanilla, dried fruit (2) and bean seed 
Zimbabwe, 1996  Two ‘successful’ cases were in seed supplies (millet and 
sorghum), and sorghum grain (for Chibuku breweries)  
Mali/Burkina Faso, 
1996 
Six ‘successful’ cases, of which two were mainly 
concerned with cotton, one with rice, one with shea butter 
soap production, and two with mango drying 
 
 





Ghana  Inventory credit project with cooperatives – brought major 
benefits to participating farmers, but at high supervisory 
cost; could not be spun off.  
Coulter and Shepherd 
1995 
Francophone Africa  Parastatally-marketed cotton, not staple food products, has 
been the major driver of producer organization  
Bingen 1998 
Tanzania  Rapid demise of cooperative activity with cereals with the 
onset of liberalization, contrasts with slower decline in 
case of some other crops, notably coffee 
Coulter and Golob 1992 
Malawi  Farmers’ clubs contributed to the intensification of maize 
under parastatally-controlled system of 1970s and 1980s, 
but failed in liberalized regime of 1990s; they now focus 
on cotton, tobacco and other higher value crops  
Chirwa et al. (2005) 
Mozambique  Tobacco and cotton within concession regimes overtake 
maize as leading crops for collective marketing   
Coulter 2006 
Uganda  Cereals account for around 38% by weight of 
commodities sold by POs supported by the APEP Project 
and the Uganda Cooperative Alliance.  Some highly 
successful marketing of cereals noted, partly in response 
to World Food Programme’s demand for relatively high 




Dual purpose initiatives: local food security and surplus marketing 
Francophone Africa  The major initiative with cereals has been Cereal Banks, 
at least 3,300 promoted since the early 70s with low level 
of survival 
Günther and Mück 
1995 
Kenya  Kenyan cereals banks founded since 2002 experiencing 
similar difficulties  
Coulter 2006 
Tanzania Village  stores  constructed under Rural Structures Project 
by-passed by emerging private trade  
Coulter and Golob 1992 
Central America and 
Swaziland 
Successful initiatives involving household storage in small 
metal silos 
Coulter et al. 1995; 
Bideaux et al. 2002 
Madagascar  Village Community Granaries scheme for rice achieves 
success, combining individual initiative and microfinance 






In Malawi, Chirwa et al. (2005) show how the parastatal Agricultural Development and 
Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) worked with smallholder ‘farmer clubs’ in the 1970s and 1980s 
to achieve considerable success, particularly in regards to the staple food crop, maize.  Farmer clubs 
were beneficiaries of production credits which they repaid by delivering products to ADMARC.  
However, the system largely collapsed after ADMARC lost its monopoly of maize procurement and 
could no longer ensure that clubs repaid their input credits.  Significantly, some clubs which grow 
cotton have survived, and some new ones have been established to take advantage of a policy change 
which allowed smallholder farmers to grow burley tobacco. 
Tanzania’s experience with market liberalization in the 80s and 90s provides further evidence 
of the relative unattractiveness of collective marketing with staple crops.  Generally speaking, private 
traders encroached on the cereals trade earlier than they did on the trade in cash crops such as cotton 
and coffee.  Cooperative Unions remain significant players in the coffee sector to this day, whereas 
their exit from cereal markets started during the 1980s.  At the time this was happening, donors were 
busily funding the construction of primary society stores under the ‘Rural Structures Programme’, 
with the understanding that primary societies would use these to hold surplus production.  A total of 
around 1,000 stores of circa 300 tonnes capacity were eventually built, and until the early 90s, the 
Government of Tanzania was committed to providing such stores for the majority of villages in the 
country.  In practice, however, farmers preferred to store their surplus grain at their homes rather than 
entrust it to their local primary societies, and the majority of these stores have remain unutilized to 
this day (Coulter and Golob 1992; Coulter and Schneider 2004).   
Recently, the Government of Tanzania has been seeking to put these stores to use by placing 
them under the control of collateral management companies which can grade the commodities and 
guarantee safe storage.  By making use of these empty stores, this approach can potentially give a 
new lease of life to the collective marketing of grains and other commodities.  Producer groups can 
deposit commodities in the warehouses and use inventory credit so as to sell at a time of their own 
choosing.  Indeed, the system of coffee warehouse receipts in Tanzania and grain warehouse receipts 
in Zambia already show producer groups responding positively to this incentive (Coulter 2005).  
Village stores can be used to store food for local consumption, and for this reason the Tanzanian case 
is also relevant to the section of this paper dealing with ‘dual purpose initiatives.’  
In the late 1980s TechnoServe, an NGO, devised a scheme whereby Ghanaian farmers 
organized into village cooperatives could obtain inventory credit from banks against the stocks.  
TechnoServe adopted a businesslike approach and provided the cooperatives with technical and 





repayment ranged between 95 and 100 percent.  However, the volumes cooperatives collectively 
handled were limited – usually around 300 tonnes per annum, and with a peak of 1,100 tonnes – and 
the cooperatives continued relying on the NGO to supervise storage operations, monitor cooperative 
records and activities and act as the bank’s unpaid agent, and ensure loan repayment.  Consequently, 
the system did not reach a scale at which it could cover all the related costs and provide comfort to 
the banks without the mediation of the NGO.  This sustainability problem may be partly attributed to 
local circumstances in Ghana: commercial banks were weakly represented in rural areas, had limited 
interest in agriculture, and could obtain substantial risk-free returns by investing in Treasury Bills.   
However, there appears to have been some problem with the cooperative-controlled storage model 
itself.  While members earned high returns from inventory credit, the cooperatives were unable or 
unwilling to break free from external support and become self-sustaining entities (Coulter and 
Shepherd 1995; Kwadjo 2000).    
In the case of francophone Africa and Mozambique, one might argue that the success of 
collective marketing with cotton and tobacco derives from governments instituting single channel 
systems, or zonal monopsonies, rather than these crops having any inherent advantages for producer 
groups. However, here it should be noted that while in some parts of Africa single-channel or 
monopsonistic systems remain an option with export crops, this is no longer the case with staple 
foods.  Single-channel marketing systems were en vogue with staple crops in the immediate post-
colonial period, but with the growth of informal trading systems, they became practically 
unenforceable.  These commodities are readily consumable and can be sold to thousands of potential 
customers; hence, any attempt to enforce a single-channel system is prone to establish a vibrant but 
illegal ‘parallel trade.’  
Recent Experience in Uganda 
The author is presently working in Uganda, where in June 2006 he collected information on 
producer marketing organizations in nine districts.  Most of these were working under the auspices of 
two leading technical assistance programs, notably the Agricultural Productivity Enhancement 
Program (APEP) and the Uganda Cooperative Alliance (UCA).  The cooperative movement 
experienced collapse following the market liberalization that took place in the early 1990s, but these 
programs have sought to give new life to the collective marketing concept.  The groups visited were 
not a random selection, but a purposeful choice of those which these agencies considered to have 





Both UCA and APEP involve primary level POs producing and bulking up produce for 
second-tier bodies which carry out a brokerage function on behalf of the primary level organizations.  
There are many similarities between these two promoters’ approaches, but this paper focuses mainly 
on APEP (see also Ferris 2006).  
Up to 2004, APEP (or rather its predecessor, the IDEA Project) supported production with 
numerous on-farm demonstrations, and encouraged private sector buyers (‘corporates’) to engage 
with farmers for input supply and marketing.  Since 2004, APEP has added a marketing component 
managed by the Cooperative League of the United States (CLUSA), in which farmers organize into 
small producer organizations (POs), each with 20-30 members.  Each PO has a small executive (3-4 
persons) and two ‘lead farmers’ who are responsible for hosting the demonstrations, extending 
technical knowledge to fellow group members, and estimating marketed volumes.  About ten POs 
form a ‘Depot Committee’ which is responsible for finding a market for members’ produce – see 
Figure 1.   Depending on the crop, depot committees either deal with a range of competitive buyers or 




























Source:  Ferris 2006 
 
APEP has a support structure that interacts with the POs and Depot Committees.  The 
demonstrations are managed by a ‘site manager’ who is paid a fee of US$5 per successful 
demonstration and has a target of at least 15 per season.  Numerical data suggests that both the APEP 
and the UCA-backed groups are having significant impact with staple crops, though this must be 
partly attributed to the purchasing activity of the World Food Programme (WFP), which is helping 
establish a market for maize of higher quality than that normally demanded by other end users in 






BOX 1.  Collective bulking of crops in Uganda  
Statistics for 2005 show that POs supported by APEP and primary societies belonging to Area 
Marketing Cooperatives supported by UCA altogether bulked 20,872 tonnes of commodities  and that 
staple commodities (maize, beans and rice) constituted 38% by weight, followed by coffee (25%), 
sunflower (15%), seed cotton (11%), malting barley (5%) and potatoes (4%).  All farmer groups 
reported the bulking of staple crops to be a profitable activity, and in Eastern Uganda groups 
mentioned farmers realizing profits ranging from $16 to $99 per tonne in recent harvests. However, it 
should be remembered here that the groups visited were those that UCA and APEP considered to have 
performed more successfully. 
The purchases of the World Food Programme (WFP), which was supplying food to the 
internally displaced population in northern Uganda and to people in other parts of the Great Lakes 
region, was one of the main factors driving the demand for maize.   Total WFP purchases of maize 
and maize meal in 2005 were 123,000 and 18,000 tonnes respectively, accounting for about one 
quarter of estimated national production of this crop.  WFP has been trying to apply official East 
African standards for maize which are far in excess of the quality requirements expressed by most of 
the trade.  This has made it more advantageous for POs to organize so as to ensure quality at origin, 
notably by having it mechanically shelled, eliminating diseased grain and foreign matter, and drying it 
properly using tarpaulins or drying cribs.  
 
 
Since 2004, the number of APEP-supported groups have grown spectacularly, and by March 
2006 there were 1,284 POs working through 156 depot committees.  While some of this can be 
attributed to previous projects in support of producer organizations, the growth is largely due to 
strengths in APEP’s conceptual approach.  These are as follows: 
 
•  there was a simultaneous and mutually reinforcing focus on intensification and marketing; by 
improving their marketing arrangements, farmers obtain greater revenue for their outputs and 
improve their access to inputs, thereby facilitating the process of intensification;   
•  the primary units have only 20-30 members, which stands in contrast to groups of up to 200 
members under the previous IDEA project and the policy of more or less unlimited 
membership with traditional primary cooperative societies – research literature supports this 
new approach on the grounds that it enhances group cohesion and sustainability (see 
Stringfellow et al. 1997); 
•  the internal structure is such as to encourage accountability and facilitate communications; 
individual lead farmers have specific responsibilities and must keep in regular touch with 10 
to 15 other farmers;  
•  APEP has engaged the ‘corporate’ buyers, encouraging these to invest in the supply chain and 
encouraging farmers to produce and organize in response to demand; 
•  a strict policy of avoiding handouts, beyond resources provided for demonstrations, which 
encourages farmers to value the POs as vehicles for group action and self-help rather than as 





•  not encouraging farmers to form top-heavy federative structures – farmers may cooperate 
beyond the ‘depot committee’ level but must do so entirely at their own discretion and 
expense.  
While this recent experience is encouraging, the history of collective marketing initiatives 
suggests that there are considerable hazards.  Some knowledgeable commentators point to a lack of 
integrity among leaders of producer organizations and the failure of the wider society to hold them 
accountable for misdeeds.   A recent example of this is the collapse of an important maize marketing 
project in Eastern Uganda.  APEP’s report on activities to March 2006 alludes to the risk that good 
governance and transparency fall victim to the “Big Man” syndrome in which a successful DC is 
hijacked either by local politicians or so called strong men within their ranks.  This comment echoes 
Isiaho (2005) who, commenting upon cooperatives in neighboring Kenya, stated that a large 
percentage of cooperative leaders use their positions as launching pads for entering politics. 
In practice, maintaining a policy of avoiding handouts is likely to prove particularly 
challenging, given the proliferation of rural development initiatives in Uganda, many of which offer 
free or subsidized inputs.  In view of the worldwide level of agricultural subsidies, the latter may be 
seen as entirely justifiable.  However, when subsidies are associated with group formation they may 
result in a membership that values them above what the group can deliver through cooperative 
enterprise, and thereby weaken the group at the moment of its inception.  The problems of recruiting 
non-performing members are vividly illustrated by the experience of the Kiboroa Self-Help Group 
which was assisted by a USAID project in Western Kenya.  When the project started, the group 
quickly signed up 150 farmers, but when it became apparent that KMDP would not be providing 
hand-outs, the number fell to 20; since then membership has risen to 100 of which 60 were ‘active,’ 
and the group has equity of about US$7,000 (Coulter 2006).   
Another challenge is the lack of applied numeracy.  During field visit in Uganda, the author 
found that in five out of nine districts, officers and staff of producer organizations engaged in bulking 
of products did not have key data and/or they lacked the ability to compare revenues and costs.  This 
suggests that organizations supporting collective marketing initiatives need to invest more in training 
in this area. 
Ugandan cooperatives largely collapsed in the 1990s as they failed to compete in the new 
liberalized policy environment ushered in by reforms undertaken at the beginning of the decade.  
Despite this, support for collective marketing remains a favorite activity for donors who see a 
continuing need for cooperative ventures, and believe that new or reformed structures will offer more 
effective business entities and will be more accountable to members’ interests.  The new initiatives 
have resulted in an overlay of organizational types and some duplication of activity, with different 





absorbed new donor initiatives into their existing structures.   There are also many cases in Uganda as 
in other African countries where POs have become excessively dependent on donors or local NGOs 
for material support or information.   
3.  DUAL PURPOSE INITIATIVES CONCERNED WITH 
MARKETS AND LOCAL FOOD SECURITY 
The Cereal Banks story 
Cereal banks are the best known POs concerned with staple foods in Sahelian countries.  
Thousands were organized under the auspices of NGOs and development projects in the wake of 
famines in the 1970s and 1980s3.  The objectives were to prevent farmers from ‘over-selling’ at low 
prices and then buying back at high prices, to avoid exploitation by middlemen and help surplus-
producing farmers to find a better market for their grain.  In the main part they have proved 
institutionally unsustainable, tending to progressively decapitalize and disappear once outside support 
is removed.  Drawing upon a range of sources (Gergely et al. 1990; Berg and Kent 1991; Günther and 
Mück 1995; CRS 1998, and; Reusse 2002), one can attribute the poor performance to difficulties in 
competing with private trade in ‘spatial arbitrage’ (trading between geographic locations), frequent 
losses from ‘temporal arbitrage’ (speculative storage), providing credits in the lean season to 
members who do not repay, management errors (due to a mixture of inexperience, slow collective 
decision-making, and social pressures) and corruption.   
CBs were particularly vulnerable to these problems because of the heterogeneous nature of 
their membership, including surplus producing members, deficit producing members and non-
producers, and having objectives that cover both business and social functions.  As such CB 
membership tends to lack a single-minded focus for its activity.  Part of the problem should also be 
attributed to the promoting entities’ limited time horizon and charitable outlook.  In this regard, 
Günther and Mück (1995) noted that the support these entities provided during a 20 year period never 
included an external audit.   
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Since 2002, an international agency attempted to introduce the cereal banks model into 
Kenya, through four cooperating NGOs.  The author reviewed progress in a consultancy assignment, 
but found that it was poor.  CBs were showing similar weaknesses to those of West Africa, and could 
not be considered a sustainable form of business enterprise. In particular, they had difficulty 
competing in spatial arbitrage, and there was evidence of accumulating consumer debt, slow 
collective decision-making, corruption and decapitalization.  Where decapitalization was being 
avoided, it required an unsustainable level of external supervision.   
Individual Storage Initiatives 
The Central American initiative relates to a smallholder maize dominated agricultural system 
which bears similarities to much of southern and eastern Africa.  Swiss Development Cooperation 
(SDC) supported the initiative for around 22 years, working with national implementing agencies in 
each country, and when it finally withdrew farmers in four countries had acquired between 400,000 
and 500,000 silos of average 800 kg capacity (pers. comm., SDC).  A large percentage of the silos 
were sold for cash at a price which covered the artisans’ full cost, a part was sold for credit, a part was 
subsidized, and some were donated by the transfer institutions.  The last evaluation mission (Bidaux 
et al. 2002) estimated that 40 percent of silos were sold at a subsidized price. 
However information collected earlier through a series of focus-group interviews by Coulter, 
Brussel et al. (1995) suggest that the silos would have been a major marketing success without 
subsidy, because they provided farmers with overwhelming food security and commercial advantages, 





Box 2.  Benefits from individual farmer storage of maize using galvanized iron silos in Central 
America 
 
The success of the silos is also a consequence of the promoters’ systematic and thorough 
approach to the development and marketing of silos.  For example, they ascertained acceptability of 
alternative storage structures through concept tests and pilots.  They standardized silo design so as to 
simplify marketing and facilitate larger scale production and quality control.  They helped local 
artisans become entrepreneurs, producing, selling, and providing after-sales service.  NGOs became 
an integral part of the marketing supply chain, with agreements specifying respective responsibilities 
Food security provided the key motive for rural families to acquire these silos, which 
typically of capacity of 0.82 tonnes each.  The impact on household food security was particularly 
large in the lean season when farmers had more and better quality food available.  There was a large 
reduction in post-harvest losses, and farmers no longer found themselves obliged to sell grain 
preventively to avoid losses due to pests.  They could keep it for their own consumption in the lean 
season.  Those farmers who did not own a silo and needed to acquire food in the lean season could 
do so at lower cost, since instead of going to middlemen in local trading centers, they could buy 
from neighbors who had acquired silos and had surpluses to sell.    
Some farmers acquired two or more silos and used them as part of the marketing strategy.  
Given pronounced seasonal price trends, they increased their income by selling grain at a later date.   
There were also favorable knock-on effects on production.  On the one hand, the silo favored the 
production of hybrid maize varieties that were highly susceptible to insect damage.  On the other 
hand, Guatemalan farmers also derived benefit through crop diversification.  They indicated that 
savings in the amount of grain stored in the silo allowed them to cultivate more coffee, bananas, and 
vegetables. 
Except in native-American communities in Guatemala, women were found to administer the 
silo, and this gave them greater control over the household food supply and greater ability to deal 
with shortages.  Moreover, the use of silos reduced female drudgery (in shelling cobs, cleaning), 
which resulted in greater hygiene in the home and was perceived to contribute to better health due to 
the absence of contamination by rodents, insects, and feces, as well as contact insecticides previously 
used to preserve grain.  
Another important advantage of the silo was the convenience factor.  Despite the poverty of 
most farmers, the simplicity of the structure was a major attraction.  It could be purchased “ready to 
use”, without the need for the farmer to find the materials him/herself; it did not require much 
maintenance and was easy to use. 
The silos contributed to price stabilization at national and regional level.  Farmers held part 
of their grain as a precautionary reserve in case the next crop turned out to be poor.  Once they knew 
the crop was ripening satisfactorily, they would sell the surplus and thereby put a damper on lean 
season prices.   
Source: Coulter, Brussel and Wright 1995.  The authors carried out an evaluation covering Honduras, 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua.  The work involved desk research, interviews with key informants 
and 42 focus groups in 14 communities spread throughout the four participating countries.  In each 
community separate interviews were held with groups of male silo owners, women silo owners, and a 





of the NGO and the project.  When SDC ended its support, it did so in the confidence that artisans 
would continue producing high-quality silos to satisfy the demand of small farmers and others. 
In Swaziland, farmers started using silos made of corrugated sheets to store maize in 
the 1960s.  They normally use them in conjunction with drying cribs, which they use to dry 
the grain before shelling and storage.  The level of adoption of the silo is very high, as much 
as 10 units for every 100 head of population, vis à vis an average of 1.5/100 in four Central 
American countries; this is somewhat surprising, given that the cost of silos was lower and 
the quality control over their fabrication and usage superior in Central America.  It appears 
that adoption has been spurred by the public incentive framework for maize production, 
which allowed most farmers to produce substantial quantities, as well as farming families 
investing remittances from South Africa to acquire the silo (Coulter and Schneider 2004).    
In 2000, the Catholic Diocese of Homa Bay started to introduce the silo of Central American 
design into Western Kenya, and by the end of 2005, some 500 units had been sold.  Demand was 
increasing, despite the absence of subsidy.  The user profile was very different to Central America and 
Swaziland, since half the silos produced (these being the larger units) was acquired by institutions, 
mostly schools, rather than rural households (Coulter 2006).   
When these experiences with small metal silos are contrasted with cereal banks and collective 
storage initiatives such as Tanzanian Rural Structures Programme, they suggest that in the case of 
dual purpose initiatives, more can be achieved through individual than collective action.   
Madagascar: The Village Community Graneries (GCV) Scheme 
The scheme involves farmers who produce rice and other agricultural commodities on small 
plots, mainly for home and local consumption.  The scheme started in the early 90s, and by 2003 
involved 27,000 small farmers holding 80,000 tonnes of paddy in stores with capacity ranging from 5 
to 120 tonnes each.   Fraslin (2005) claims that by enabling farmers to store longer, it has provided 
them with a financial surplus equivalent to a 50 percent increase in paddy yield, as well as 
contributing to the stabilization of prices regionally.   
The scheme was set up by a large network of village-based credit unions (the ‘Caisses 
d’Epargne et de Crédit Agricole Mutuels’, or CECAM), which enjoyed the assistance of an NGO, 
various French agricultural unions, European cooperative bankers (Rabobank and Crédit Agricole 
Mutuel) and several donors. According to Fraslin (2004), a key to this achievement was the members’ 
subscription of substantial equity capital, which at once committed them to the Endeavour, and helped 





2006.   The CECAMs provide members with inventory credit along with seasonal production credit, 
leasing, and other credit products, and there is also a more modest savings facility.  Together with its 
regional federation (URECAM), they also provide a complete supervisory structure for ensuring 
correct storage protocols and the integrity of the inventory credit system.   
This experience shows that it is possible to organize sound village-based inventory credit 
systems within a strong movement of rural credit unions or rural banks.  However, it has to be 
recognized that most African countries do not have such large or robust member-owned rural savings 
and credit organizations, and this makes it more difficult to achieve the same result.   Uganda is a case 
in point.  A major review of agricultural finance in Uganda found that there were hundreds of 
SACCOs and other member-owned financial organizations, but that “they were among the weakest 
and least sustainable of the financial institutions” in that country, and that “they had not been able to 
significantly improve their financial position in spite of heavy donor support” (Meyer et al. 2004).  
Government is currently seeking to develop rural finance through its ‘Bona Bagagawale’ (Wealth for 
All) program of support to microfinance institutions, but it will take some time to see whether this is 
effective.   
4.  WHOSE INITIATIVES ARE THEY? 
Some analysts have highlighted the value of farmers organizing their own initiatives, rather 
than their being promoted by outsiders, such as donors or NGOs.  The early history of cooperatives 
provides some weight to this argument, in that the first successful model, involving consumer 
cooperatives in the UK, emerged from the spontaneous efforts of flannel weavers without the 
involvement of any of the well-to-do philanthropists who promoted cooperative initiatives among 
working class people in the early 19
th Century.    
However, there is a difficulty with this argument in contemporary Africa.  Unlike the case in 
early to mid-19
th Century Europe, there are many public and private organizations seeking to promote 
collective marketing among rural people.  Collective marketing may start through the spontaneous 
efforts of individual farmers, but initiatives with prospects for success generally attract the eye of 
outside organizations, and their assistance is more often accepted than not.   One cannot deny the 
importance of local ownership, but it is almost inevitable under current circumstances that outsiders 
will get involved in one way or another.   
Farmer Field Schools, discussed by Okoth et al. (2006) for Uganda, offer farmers a way of 
learning to work together to solve agronomic and other problems, before making larger financial 





best interests and build social capital to undertake such initiatives.  However it is worth noting that 
these producer organizations, in common with others, receive outside support and grants.   Moreover, 
as soon as they wish to grow beyond the ‘school’ and ‘pilot’ stages and become commercial 
enterprises in their own right, economies of scale become an issue.  This means that they tend to need 
standardized federative structure covering many communities and technical assistance packages that 
are modularized to the structure.  There is a limit to which one can economically tailor technical 
assistance to the need of each individual PO.  This inevitably results in a process of negotiation with 
outside service suppliers – projects, NGOs and companies – whereby the group gives away some of 
its local autonomy in exchange for external support.   However home-grown or indigenous POs are at 
origin, they grow up in the era of development cooperation, and they respond to the (often competing) 
offers of outside service providers and funding agencies.   The quality of the service of these latter 
agencies is therefore one of the keys to their success.   
At the same time, some PO initiatives that are apparently formulaic and NGO-driven may 
engender considerable sense of ownership among members, because the NGO concerned has invested 
time in understanding problems up front and reviewing previous initiatives, and because their 
formulae incorporate certain principles and practices which have stood the test of time.  An example 
of the latter may be, as in the APEP case above, telling farmers they need to invest their own 
resources in the business rather than expecting outsiders to put up the money.  Such hard decisions 
tend to concentrate members’ minds as to whether the enterprise is really theirs or simply an outside 
implant of which they can take advantage for a time. 
In conclusion then, we feel local ownership is of the greatest importance, but that it is 
unrealistic under present circumstances to argue in terms of idealized organizations created purely 
from the bottom up.  Moreover it is right to focus on the role of outside promoters and financiers, 
since they are to a major extent those ‘who pay the piper.’ 
5.  CONCLUSIONS AND ANALYSIS OF CAUSES 
The evidence presented above shows that while collective marketing is proving successful 
with staple crops in some cases, it has generally been more difficult than with higher value cash 
crops.  It is probable that the explanation lies in differences in the benefits and costs of cooperation 
for higher and lower value crops respectively.   
Here it is important to recognize that the act of cooperating with one’s neighbors involves 
considerable ‘hidden’ costs of a kind that are not usually reflected in group profit and loss accounts, 






•  Costs that individuals incur from loss of autonomy within the group – to buy and sell produce 
of any quality, to whom they want and when they want; 
•  The opportunity cost of time spent in meetings and communications with other group 
members; 
•  Costs of enforcing agreed behavior on officers, staff and other group members, including the 
settlement of disputes and the application of sanctions.  ‘Agreed behavior’ may for example 
involve protocols for spraying, the rejection of produce which does not meet specified 
standards, or a ban on ‘side-selling’ of produce in contempt of contractual commitments to 
buyers which have provided services, inputs, and/or credit.     
 
The greater the added value per unit of collective, as opposed to individual, effort, the easier 
it is for producers to bear the above costs, and the more likely it is that they will wish to cooperate 
together.  Cash crops do not always provide high returns to effort, but some of the cases cited in Table 
1 (e.g. vanilla, dried fruit and seeds) concern situations where niche markets and premium prices have 
provided producers with a strong incentive to get organized.   
At the same time, the lower the ‘hidden’ costs are, the more likely it is that producers will 
wish to work collectively.  Commodity chains involving higher value crops often have fewer buyers, 
and this reduces risks of contractual failure vis-à-vis the case with most staple foods.  In the case of 
cotton and tobacco, there are often only a few ginners and tobacco companies with capacity to supply 
inputs and technical support, and to buy and process the crop; this reduces the ‘costs of enforcing 
agreed behavior’ referred to above.  In some countries, such as Mozambique, the State zones the 
procurement of these crops, and this further reduces these costs; such measures are practically 
unenforceable in the case of staple foods due to the vast number of potential buyers and marketing 
channels.  In Tanzania, coffee producers have had limited choice as to where they have their coffee 
cured and graded prior to export, and no choice but to export through the auction at Moshi.  This 
narrow marketing channel helps banks in the recovery of production and marketing credit they 
provide to primary societies, and this in turn renders the primary societies more bankable and viable.  
Export-based horticulture is another case where there are few buyers.  The self-same crops can be 
sold on the local market, but few buyers have the necessary organization to provide access to 
premium export markets.    
This proposition also implies that it is possible to increase the prospects for success of 
collective marketing, with staples as with other crops, by maximizing added value per unit of effort 
and minimizing the hidden costs.  Table 2 suggests some ways in which this can be achieved. 





Table 2 – Ways of ‘accentuating the positive’ in collective marketing 
Measure Advantage/comment 
1.  Seek to develop collective marketing among 
groups with a history of collective Endeavour, e.g. 
traditional forms of cooperative activity, and Farmer 
Field Schools such as those in Uganda (Okoth et al. 
2006) 
Such groups tend to have more organizational skills 
and a higher level of internal discipline and trust, 
reducing ‘hidden costs’ 
2.  Focus on simple activities, e.g. bulking, accessing 
input supplies, joint liability for credits  
Minimizes complexity of collective decision-making 
3.  Constitute small primary groups (not more than 30 
members) 
Allows for more face-to-face interaction, and 
accountability between members 
More difficult for politicians and ‘strong men’ to 
assume control 
4.  Homogeneous membership, with regard to their 
interests and objectives 
Makes for a more single-minded focus on the group’s 
objectives  
5.  Seek out stable relationships with strong trade 
counter-parties, where these are profitable  
Trade counter-party will have an interest in groups’ 
success and survival.  A potential disadvantage of 
such stable relationship is that they expose the group 
to exploitation by the counter-party.  Collective 
marketers should try to maintain some independence 
of action.  This may involve studying the market, 
negotiating better terms, and/or seeking expert 
assistance from federative bodies or NGOs with 
specialist capabilities. 
6.  Training/awareness-raising with members and 
leaders, especially re attitudes and business skills  
Increases cohesion of the organization and quality of 
decision-making 
7.  Combining collective marketing with technical 
support to production 
Larger volume and value of produce increases 
benefits from collective marketing 
8.  Focus on products offering a higher return to 
collective effort.  In the case of cereals, this may 
mean producing seed or grain for higher 
quality/specialist market segments 
Makes it easier to recuperate the ‘costs’ of 
cooperation 
9.  Establish independently managed storage services 
and warehouse receipt systems which are accessible 
to producer groups  
Independent collateral management makes producer 
groups more bankable and increases their marketing 
options 
10.  Stronger efforts to enforce the law in case of 
wrong-doing (e.g. in recent case involving Nakasenyi 
Adult Literacy Group, Iganga, Uganda) 
Sends out a message that wrong-doing does not pay in 
projects supporting producer organizations  
 
The first four of items in Table 2 re-emphasize the findings of Stringfellow et al. (1997), who 
found that successful group enterprises were more likely to have a history of cooperative Endeavour 





activities involving the operation of jointly owned assets and in obtaining credit against group 
guarantees.  They also found evidence of successful enterprises being built on patterns of social 
interaction, notably among women.  The fifth item reiterates their observation that group enterprises 
often worked most effectively under contract with agribusinesses that lock them into the value chain 
and provide credit, inputs, and markets.  However, for reasons discussed earlier, this is often difficult 
with staple commodities.   
The sixth item picks up on the section of this paper dealing with Uganda and on the 
experience of the Kenya Maize Development Project (KMDP), whose training package is 
emphasizing ‘farming as a business’, forward planning of farming and group enterprises, and 
changing attitudes4 (Coulter 2006).  Items 7 to 9 are based on observations throughout the paper, and 
emphasize the need to maximize the farmers’ return to effort spent on cooperative activity.  Item 9 
picks up on our discussion of coffee curing factories in Tanzania.  Primary Societies deposit their 
coffee with the factories and obtain ‘warehouse receipts’ which they use to raise marketing credit 
from a local bank to cover immediate financial needs.  The curing company is in effect “collaterally 
managing” the stock on behalf of the bank, which can easily recover the credit when the primary 
society sells the product.  Indeed, by adding a reputable service provider to the commodity chain, the 
farmers increase their marketing options and make their primary societies more bankable.  It is now 
the track record of the coffee curing company, rather than the primary society itself, that ensures them 
access to credit.  The last item recalls that the role wider society and the State need to play in 
stimulating strong cooperative behavior. 
The cases examined above suggest that collective approaches are less likely to be successful 
when they involve dual objectives of food security and surplus disposal, primarily because such 
initiatives fall short of suggestions in items 3 and 7.  Firstly, enterprises collectively marketing staple 
crops bring together a variety of stakeholder groups with varied interests and have a mix of business 
and social objectives, which tends to result in slow and weak decision-making.  Secondly, as shown 
by Berg and Kent (1991) spatial and temporal arbitrage tends to be less profitable than promoters 
envisage, and committee-led entities find it difficult to compete with private traders.   At the same 
                                                      
 
4 The following observation provides some insight as to how attitudes can constrain development.  During the 
author’s visit to Kitale district in Kenya, a group member characterized farmers’ outlook by saying that people 
tended to see themselves as failures, had little scope for improving their situation as farmers, and that the only 
way forward was to get a white collar job.  The statement is very significant when one considers that Kitale 
farmers are privileged among farmers in Kenya with relatively abundant land and good market access (Coulter, 
2006).   





time we have pointed to alternative approaches which involve greater reliance on individual initiative, 
including both individual silos and individual storage supported by local microfinance institutions.   
Collective marketing is an area where avoidable mistakes are frequently made.  For example, 
the lessons of cereal banks could have been learnt and acted upon in a single decade, whereas in 
practice they went on being promoted for over three decades in one or other area of Africa.  In the 
case of Tanzania, it should not have been necessary to build 1,000 village stores before discovering 
they would remain redundant.   Those involved with collective marketing should reflect on this and 
seek to reduce the probability of recurrence. 
In the author’s experience the problem arises from poverty alleviation and programmatic 
pressures within the donor community.  Budgetary processes provide compelling reasons for donors 
and NGOs to spend money, and these are often augmented by political and bureaucratic pressures 
within the host country, placing in an invidious position those officials and consultants who have 
doubts over the wisdom of the respective expenditures, and whether they will make a lasting 
contribution to poverty alleviation.  In this we share concerns expressed by William Easterly (2006, 
p.137) that the aid system sometimes pursues contradictory objectives.   
Some of the above-mentioned cases show that despite these pressures, project promoters 
sometimes succeed in devising and implementing imaginative projects and programs with better 
prospects for sustainability.  There is, however, a danger that the current focus on Africa and the 
frequent advocacy of ‘big pushes’ to eliminate poverty will lead to more, rather than less, wasteful 
initiatives, and it is for this reason – rather than any questioning of Africa’s need for assistance – that 
this paper sounds an alarm.   
6.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Two basic policy recommendations arise from the previous discussion.  Firstly, at a practical 
level, those designing any rural marketing project should analyze the value chain in such a way as to 
identify activities which best lend themselves to individual initiative, and those where group 
approaches are more likely to prosper.  As a general rule, they will find that dual purpose initiatives 
involving food security and marketing are more likely to succeed when they rely upon individual 
initiative, albeit within a framework of micro-credit support.   
Single-purpose collective marketing initiatives are most likely to succeed where the 
cooperation involves significant value addition, which can occur where they complement agricultural 





buyers.  Producer organizations and their promoters can also increase the prospects for success by 
adopting other measures suggested in Table 2.   
 Secondly, donors (bilateral, multilateral, and private) and governments need to find ways of 
improving the overall quality of agricultural marketing initiatives, particularly those involving 
collective action.   They should seek to do this in a way which does not involve heavy-handed control 
and leaves players with as much freedom of action as possible.   One way of doing this is to establish 
a system of independent reviews, with the reviewers being contracted by bodies which are completely 
independent of the agency being evaluated or even the agency financing the initiative concerned.  
Another would be to institute strict peer-review mechanisms on a country basis.  Anybody seeking to 
implement an agricultural marketing initiative should be required to periodically present the project 
concerned to assembled peers knowledgeable of the subject in question.   
While this may seem like a common sense recommendation, a measure that exposes to public 
scrutiny the players in the aid and development business will in many cases be forcefully resisted.  
However, it is worth the pain; it is one measure which will allow us to quickly improve the quality of 
development assistance, without additional expenditure.  It could also build a basis for understanding 
of what works and what does not. 
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